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Intense circulation of A/H5N1 and other avian
influenza viruses in Cambodian live-bird markets with
serological evidence of sub-clinical human infections
Srey Viseth Horm1,*, Arnaud Tarantola1, Sareth Rith1, Sowath Ly1, Juliette Gambaretti1, Veasna Duong1,
Phalla Y1, San Sorn2, Davun Holl2, Lotfi Allal3, Wantanee Kalpravidh4, Philippe Dussart1, Paul F Horwood1,*
and Philippe Buchy1,5,*
Surveillance for avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in poultry and environmental samples was conducted in four live-bird markets
in Cambodia from January through November 2013. Through real-time RT-PCR testing, AIVs were detected in 45% of 1048
samples collected throughout the year. Detection rates ranged from 32% and 18% in duck and chicken swabs, respectively,
to 75% in carcass wash water samples. Influenza A/H5N1 virus was detected in 79% of samples positive for influenza A virus
and 35% of all samples collected. Sequence analysis of full-length haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes from
A/H5N1 viruses, and full-genome analysis of six representative isolates, revealed that the clade 1.1.2 reassortant virus
associated with Cambodian human cases during 2013 was the only A/H5N1 virus detected during the year. However, multiplex
reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) analysis of HA and NA genes revealed co-circulation of at least nine
low pathogenic AIVs from HA1, HA2, HA3, HA4, HA6, HA7, HA9, HA10 and HA11 subtypes. Four repeated serological surveys
were conducted throughout the year in a cohort of 125 poultry workers. Serological testing found an overall prevalence of 4.5%
and 1.8% for antibodies to A/H5N1 and A/H9N2, respectively. Seroconversion rates of 3.7 and 0.9 cases per 1000 person-
months participation were detected for A/H5N1 and A/H9N2, respectively. Peak AIV circulation was associated with the Lunar
New Year festival. Knowledge of periods of increased circulation of avian influenza in markets should inform intervention
measures such as market cleaning and closures to reduce risk of human infections and emergence of novel AIVs.
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INTRODUCTION
Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) naturally infect the gastrointestinal tracts
of wild birds from the Orders Anseriformes (ducks, geese and swans) and
Charadriformes (waders and gulls). Within these hosts, 16 haemagglu-
tinin (HA) and nine neuraminidase (NA) surface glycoprotein types have
been described. The HA and NA types carried by the virus are used for
classification and can be found in various combinations, such as A/H5N1
and A/H3N2. Wild birds have been implicated in the global dissemina-
tion of AIVs and, in some instances, the introduction of AIVs into
domestic poultry populations.1 Although low pathogenic avian influenza
(LPAI) viruses (which have limited impact on poultry mortalities)
constitute the majority of these viruses, highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) viruses such as A/H5N1 can result in mortalities approaching
100% when introduced into domestic flocks.2
Influenza A viruses, which constitute all of the known AIVs, have
a segmented genome with eight separate RNA strands enclosed in the
virus. When an animal is co-infected with two different influenza
viruses, reassortment of these RNA segments can occur, resulting in
a new virus with characteristics distinct from the parent viruses.3 The
2009 emergence and resulting pandemic from A/H1N1pdm09 virus
was caused by a virus that underwent multiple reassortment events
with strains from pigs, birds and humans before suddenly gaining the
ability to efficiently transmit between humans.4 Pandemic events
resulting from reassortment of influenza viruses have occurred at least
three times in the last 100 years,5,6 resulting in high human morbidity
and mortality worldwide. The most severe influenza pandemic in
recorded history, the 1918 ‘Spanish flu’, is thought to have arose from
an avian influenza strain that directly adapted to the human host.7
Clearly it is imperative that close monitoring of reassortments and
mammalian-adapted mutations in avian influenza strains is needed.
Since the emergence of HPAI A/H5N1 in Southern China in 1996
and 1997,8 descendants of this virus have caused considerable
economic losses in poultry populations, primarily in east and southeast
Asia, but also in Africa and Europe. Influenza A/H5N1 has been
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identified as a significant threat for pandemic emergence. To date, at
least 844 people have been infected worldwide, resulting in 449 deaths
(53% case fatality rate). The virus was first detected in Cambodian
poultry in early 2004 and the first human cases were detected in 2005.9
As of December 2015, 56 human cases (including 37 deaths) and 43
poultry outbreaks of influenza A/H5N1 have been recorded in the
country.10,11
Live-bird markets (LBMs) have been implicated as an important
source of human sporadic cases and dissemination of avian influenza
since the emergence of influenza A/H5N1.12 Previous studies have
established that LBMs serve as hubs for the circulation and persistence
of AIVs through the presence of multiple avian species, the constant
introduction of immunologically naive hosts and the frequent lack of
biosecurity measures.1,13,14 Recent surveillance studies have documen-
ted that A/H5N1 and A/H7N9 commonly co-circulate with other
subtypes of avian influenza in LBMs,15–17 thus increasing the like-
lihood of reassortment events.
In the present study we initiated poultry and environmental
surveillance for A/H5N1 and other AIVs in four LBMs in Cambodia
to better ascertain virus circulation in this setting. A longitudinal
human serosurvey was also conducted to investigate the risk of human
avian influenza infections in exposed LBM workers.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Animal and environmental samples
Commencing in January 2013, through November 2013, environ-
mental and poultry samples were collected at four LBMs in Cambodia:
an LBM in central Phnom Penh (M1), a wholesaling farm/slaughter
house in Phnom Penh (M2), an LBM in Kampong Cham province
(M3) and an LBM in Takeo province (M4) (Figure 1). These LBMs
were selected for the study as they represent the largest poultry
collection sites in the most densely populated region of the country.
Samples were collected from each market every 1–2 weeks (Figure 1).
The LBMs in Cambodia typically have poor biosecurity, with slaughter-
ing of animals onsite occurring for a range of domestic animals
(Figure 2). Birds are typically sourced from backyard flocks by
middlemen who transport the animals through a convoluted system
of semi-commercial farms and stock houses before being transported
to the main LBMs.18 Thus, tracking the original source of poultry is
usually not possible.
During each market investigation, tracheal and cloacal swabs were
collected (both samples pooled in one tube of viral transport medium
for each animal) from four randomly selected poultry (three ducks and
one chicken). Environmental samples were also collected in the same
cage/site where the poultry swabs were collected to investigate
contamination of the LBMs with AIVs. During each mission, 50 ml
of carcass wash water (water used to wash the carcasses once the
poultry has been slaughtered and defeathered), 50 ml of poultry
drinking water (small bowl of water placed in cages), soil/mud from
an area within 50 cm around the poultry cages/poultry resting area and
samples of discarded feathers were collected. The water, soil/mud and
feather samples were processed and nucleic acids extracted following
techniques described previously.19,20 Extracts were then tested by
quantitative real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction
(qRT-PCR) for the detection of M, H5 and N1 genes.
M-gene-positive samples, for which there was sufficient sample and
high virus concentration (CTo30; n= 78), were inoculated into
specific pathogen-free embryonated chicken eggs for virus isolation.21
Isolates were then tested using influenza universal multiplex RT-PCR
assays to test for all known subtypes of influenza.22 Universal multiplex
Figure 1 Map showing communes with reported confirmed human A/H5N1 cases during 2006–2014, population density (indicated by the number of
villages) and live-bird markets investigated in 2013.
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RT-PCR typing assays were also applied to the original samples where
isolation could not be achieved but discordance between M-gene and
H5 qRT-PCR testing suggested the presence of a non-H5 AIV. The
amplified RT-PCR products from isolates and original material were
submitted to a commercial sequencing facility (Macrogen, Seoul, South
Korea) for sequencing by the Sanger method. Full-genome sequences
were generated from representative A/H5N1 isolates using methods
previously described.9,23
Contiguous sequences were assembled using CLC Workbench (CLC
bio) and compared to representative influenza virus sequences down-
loaded from the NCBI GenBank database. Neighbour-joining trees
were constructed with MEGA524 and bootstrap values were calculated
and expressed as a percentage from 1000 replicates.
Human samples
The longitudinal human serological study was approved by the
National Ethics Committee for Human Research (approval NO. 267,
24 December 2012). Serum samples were collected, after obtaining
informed consent, from LBM workers at the start of the study
(January 2013) to form a baseline, and 8 weeks after the three major
national festivals shown by previous work to be associated with
increased A/H5N1 circulation in markets:25 Lunar New Year, week 6;
Khmer New Year, week 15; Pchum Ben, week 40. All adult-age LBM
sellers or workers were exhaustively recruited in the four targeted live-
poultry markets. The sample size could not be calculated as transmis-
sion to humans was unlikely and its probability in Cambodia
is unknown. Participants were informed to report any acute febrile,
respiratory or digestive signs, and were provided with a toll-free phone
number.
Serum samples were tested for avian influenza A/H5N1, A/H9N2
and A/H7N9 antibodies using the haemagglutination inhibition assay
(HIA) and microneutralization assay (MN). The HIA and MN testing
were performed using influenza A/H5N1 clade 1.1.2 reassortant
viruses (A/Cambodia/X0121311/2013 and A/Cambodia/ X0125302-
/2013), which were isolated from human cases during 2013, and
influenza A/H9N2 virus (A/Environment/Cambodia/E265/2013),
which was isolated from the LBMs during 2013. The HIA and MN
testing for A/H7N9 were performed using the strain A/Anhui/01/2013,
supplied through the World Health Organization (WHO) Global
Influenza Surveillance and Response System (Dr Sylvie van der Werf,
Department of Virology, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France). Exposure to
these viruses was considered ‘confirmed’ with a HIA titre of ≥ 80 and
a MN titre of ≥ 40. A seroconversion was defined as the detection of
antibodies equal to or above the thresholds defined above following no
detection of antibodies in the serum sample from the previous period.
Laboratory data were entered using an Excel spreadsheet (Microsoft
Excel, Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA). A baseline assessment was
documented using point prevalence for influenza antibodies, and
incidence rates during follow-up were then computed using data on
laboratory-confirmed seroconversions in LBM workers (numerator),
and the number of days elapsed during the last serosurvey (denomi-
nator). Poisson confidence intervals for the incidence rates were
computed using Stata 11 (Stata Corp., College Station, TX, USA) with
Figure 2 Live-bird markets in Cambodia typically have poor biosecurity, with multiple animal species slaughtered onsite. Animal and environmental
sampling in these markets is crucial to monitor virus circulation and the emergence/introduction of new viruses.
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the function cii for the binomial CI, and the functions cii and the
option ‘poisson’ for the poisson CI.
RESULTS
Animal and environmental surveillance of A/H5N1
During the study, a total of 1048 samples were collected, with 45% of
all samples positive for influenza A RNA by qRT-PCR (Table 1).
Influenza A viruses were detected in at least one sample during 93% of
120 collection missions, with influenza virus detected in three of the
markets (M1, M2 and M3) on all but one sampling mission and
detected in 83% of sampling missions from the remaining market
(M4). Influenza A (M-gene) ribonucleic acid (RNA) was detected
most frequently in carcass wash water samples (75%, n= 146),
followed by feathers (61%, n= 138), poultry drinking water (50%,
n= 138), soil/mud (48%, n= 146), duck swabs (32%, n= 358) and
chicken swabs (18%, n= 122). H5 and N1 genes were detected in 79%
(n= 372) and 58% (n= 270), respectively, of the 468 samples that
tested positive for influenza A (M-gene), which accounted for 35%
and 26% of all samples collected, respectively. Peak AIV circulation
was detected from January through March, with particularly high
detection rates during the Lunar New Year festival period (Figure 3).
Influenza A/H5N1 virus was isolated from 71% (55/78) of samples
from which H5 was detected and isolation was attempted. Isolation
was only attempted on high viral load samples (M-gene qRT-PCR CT
Table 1 Results of qRT-PCR tests on environmental samples and poultry swab specimens collected from four live poultry markets in Cambodia,
2013 (results displayed by sample type and by market)
Sample type Market IDa Number of samples
positive: M (%)
Number of samples
positive: H5 (%)
Number of samples
positive: N1 (%)
Isolation rate of A/H5N1 from
qRT-PCR high viral load samplesb
Poultry drinking water M1 21/36 (58) 18/36 (50) 11/36 (31) 80% (8/10)
M2 14/36 (39) 9/36 (25) 8/36 (22)
M3 19/36 (53) 14/36 (39) 10/36 (28)
M4 15/30 (50) 14/30 (47) 9/30 (30)
All 4 M 69/138 (50) 55/138 (40) 38/138 (28)
Carcass washing water M1 32/39 (82) 31/39 (79) 27/39 (69) 53% (8/15)
M2 25/40 (63) 19/40 (48) 9/40 (23)
M3 31/36 (86) 29/36 (81) 26/36 (72)
M4 22/31 (71) 22/31 (71) 17/31 (55)
All 4 M 110/146 (75) 101/146 (69) 79/146 (54)
Soil/mud M1 22/39 (56) 18/39 (46) 16/39 (41) 72% (13/18)
M2 26/40 (65) 18/40 (45) 13/40 (33)
M3 13/36 (36) 10/36 (28) 8/22 (22)
M4 9/31 (29) 9/31 (29) 5/31 (16)
All 4 M 70/146 (48) 55/146 (38) 42/146 (29)
Feathers M1 27/36 (75) 23/36 (64) 17/36 (47) 64% (7/11)
M2 24/36 (67) 19/36 (53) 11/36 (31)
M3 21/36 (58) 19/36 (53) 10/36 (28)
M4 12/30 (40) 11/30 (37) 7/30 (23)
All 4 M 84/138 (61) 72/138 (52) 45/138 (33)
Duck swab M1 34/90 (38) 30/90 (33) 22/90 (24) 83% (19/23)
M2 26/97 (27) 10/97 (10) 8/97 (8)
M3 30/90 (33) 17/90 (19) 15/90 (17)
M4 23/81 (28) 20/81 (25) 13/81 (16)
All 4 M 113/358 (32) 77/358 (22) 58/358 (16)
Chicken swab M1 8/30 (27) 6/30 (20) 5/30 (17) 0% (0/1)
M2 4/23 (17) 2/23 (9) 1/23 (4)
M3 8/30 (27) 3/30 (10) 1/30 (3)
M4 2/39 (5) 1/39 (3) 1/39 (3)
All 4 M 22/122 (18) 12/122 (10) 8/122 (7)
Total M1 144/270 (53) 126/270 (47) 98/270 (36) 71% (55/78)
M2 119/272 (44) 77/272 (28) 50/272 (18)
M3 122/264 (46) 92/264 (35) 70/264 (27)
M4 83/242 (34) 77/242 (32) 52/242 (21)
All 4 M 468/1048 (45) 372/1048 (35) 270/1048 (26)
Abbreviation: quantitative reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction, qRT-PCR.
aMarket identification (ID): M1, an LBM in central Phnom Penh; M2, a wholesaling farm/slaughter house in Phnom Penh; M3, an LBM in Kampong Cham province; M4, an LBM in Takeo province;
4 M, pooled results of these four markets.
bSamples were inoculated into embryonated chicken eggs for virus isolation when the M-gene qRT-PCR CT value was o30.
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value o30) and success rates differed considerably by sample type,
with isolation being highest in duck swabs (83%, 19/23), followed by
poultry drinking water (80%, 8/10), soil/mud (72%, 13/18), feathers
(64%, 7/11), carcass wash water (53%, 8/15) and chicken swabs
(0%, 0/1).
Full-gene sequences were generated for H5 (n= 22) and N1
(n= 21) for all viruses detected in the study where sufficient virus
concentration allowed for successful sequencing (Figure 4).10,23 Full-
genome sequences (eight fragments) were generated for six influenza
A/H5N1 viruses detected during the study (Supplementary Figure S1).
For other viruses full-gene sequences could not be generated for all
fragments (Supplementary Table S1). All A/H5N1 viruses detected in
the study clustered with the clade 1.1.2 reassortant strains associated
with human cases and poultry outbreaks of A/H5N1 during 2013.10
Non-H5 avian influenza detection
A large number and variety of non-H5 avian influenza strains were
detected during the study. Full-HA sequences were generated
from two H1, two H2, three H3, nine H4, 15 H6, one H7, 27
H9, one H10 and twelve H11 viruses (Supplementary Figure S2).
Full NA sequences from twenty-two N2, one N3, one N5, two N6,
one N8 and two N9 subtypes were also generated from the same
samples (Supplementary Figure S3). However, as many of the
environmental samples contained evidence of multiple avian
influenza strains, it was difficult to ascertain that HA and NA
sequences derived from the same sample actually belonged to the
same virus strain. Co-infections between AIVs were not detected in
any poultry samples. Many other partial HA and NA sequences
were also generated, but not included in these results due
to difficulties in determining close phylogenetic relationships from
incomplete gene sequences. AIVs were detected throughout the
year (Figure 5), with a distinct peak of activity during January−
March, perhaps mostly due to the increased circulation of A/H5N1
during major Cambodian festivals, as previously reported.25
Longitudinal human serosurvey
Successive serological surveys in the poultry worker cohort provided
evidence of seroconversions and some prior exposure (Table 2).
At baseline sampling (January 2013), 125 participants were enrolled in
the study, with one person testing positive to A/H5N1 antibodies and
another testing positive to A/H9N2 antibodies. Participant retention
was high throughout the study, with 117, 105 and 106 people
resampled at the second (March 2013), third (June 2013) and fourth
(November 2013) sampling missions, respectively. Seroconversions to
A/H5N1 were detected for two participants at the third sampling and
two participants at the fourth sampling. Seroconversions to A/H9N2
were detected for one participant at the third sampling. Overall
seroprevalence was 4.5% for A/H5N1 and 1.8% for A/H9N2. Rates
of seroconversion were 3.7 infections per 1000 person-months for
A/H5N1 and 0.9 infections per 1000 person-months for A/H9N2.
There was no serological evidence of exposure or molecular detection
of A/H7N9 before or during the study.
There were no calls to the toll-free number reporting an incident
with clinical signs or symptoms compatible with influenza infection.
DISCUSSION
LBMs have been established as important foci for the transmission of
AIVs and the potential emergence of reassortant strains.13 The
presence of multiple host species and the continued introduction of
naive birds create an ideal environment for the persistence and
emergence of AIVs. Exposure to live poultry has been associated with
fatal human A/H5N1 infections, which for instance led to the
government of Hong Kong rapidly closing LBMs in 1997 and
slaughtering large numbers of poultry.26 The LBMs surrounding
Phnom Penh have been established as foci for poultry movement in
the country18,27 and a previous market surveillance study in 2011
revealed a high rate of influenza A/H5N1 circulation in this setting.25
To our knowledge, AIVs were detected in Cambodian LBMs
during 2013 at a higher frequency than any other study published
previously,25,28–34 with 45% of all samples (poultry swab and
environmental samples), 32% of individual duck swabs and 18% of
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Figure 3 Proportion of samples positive for Influenza A virus (M-gene) for each sampling mission at four live-bird markets in Cambodia, 2013. The major
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chicken swabs positive for influenza A RNA. The majority of the AIVs
detected were likely A/H5N1, with 35% of samples positive for H5
qRT-PCR. Although there was clearly high co-circulation of LPAI
viruses, much of the difference between the detection rates of M-gene,
H5 and N1 was probably due to the differing qRT-PCR assay
sensitivities (M4H54N1). We previously detected high circulation
of A/H5N1 in these same markets in 2011.25 However, in 2013 there
was a 42.5-fold increase in the frequency with which the virus was
detected despite the same sample processing, nucleic acid extraction
and RT-qPCR methods being used.
In 2013, Cambodia had the highest confirmed human A/H5N1
caseload per capita in the World. During 2013 alone, 26 human
A/H5N1 cases (14 deaths) were detected in Cambodia, a dramatic
increase in the 21 total cases that had been detected in the preceding 8
years, 2005–2012. This rise in reported human cases of A/H5N1
coincided with the emergence of a reassortant virus that contained the
HA and NA genes from the previously circulating clade 1.1.2 genotype
Z virus, and the matrix and internal genes from a clade 2.3.2.1 virus
previously circulating in southern Vietnam.10 Sequence and phyloge-
netic analyses of the HA and NA genes (Figure 4) and the matrix and
internal genes (Supplementary Figure S1) from the A/H5N1 market
strains revealed that all of the viruses clustered closely with other clade
1.1.2 reassortant strains associated with poultry outbreaks and human
cases in 2013.10 Questions remain regarding the causes of the dramatic
increase in human cases in 2013 and whether the reassortant strain is
more transmissible in poultry, resulting in the intense circulation that
we observed in this report. Alternatively, increased surveillance and
education of clinicians may have resulted in improved detection of
human A/H5N1 cases. Presently we do not know the exact role played
by LBMs in the infection of poultry workers and market clients.
Similarly to our previous LBM surveillance in 2011,25 increased
circulation of AIVs was detected before and during the major
Cambodian festivals (Figure 3). In particular, increased circulation
of influenza A viruses was detected during the period between the
Lunar New Year and Khmer New Year festivals. A previous study
on the poultry trade links in Cambodia established that there was
a significant increase in the trade volume of poultry prior to these
festivals, with an assumed rise in cross-border poultry trade in
response to increased demand.18 The greater volume of poultry trade
and the expansion of poultry trading networks during these festival
periods present opportunities for virus spread throughout domestic
flocks and the introduction of new strains of AIVs. Peaks in AIV levels
were also observed during times that were not associated with
known festivals (e.g. week 25 and 35). Climatic factors, which were
Figure 4 Neighbour-joining phylogenetic tree of the HA and NA genes of highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 viruses detected during live-bird market
surveillance in Cambodia. Viruses collected during the present market study are denoted by a black circle. Viruses for which the full genome is available are
denoted in bold. Mid-point rooted phylogenetic trees were constructed in MEGA5. Bootstraps 470 generated from 1000 replicates are shown at branch
nodes. The scale bar represents the number of nucleotide substitutions per site.
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not analysed in this study, are also likely to have an influence on
levels of AIV circulation. Knowledge of these periods of intense
circulation should inform future control policies such as targeted
poultry vaccination, quarantining and improved market cleaning.
Such measures have proven effective in reducing avian influenza
viral isolation rates in LBMs35–37 and may reduce the spread of AIVs
back to farms through fomites and personnel.38
Environmental sample testing showed that the LBM environment is
highly contaminated with AIVs (Table 1). Influenza A detection rates
were highest in carcass wash water samples, which serve as ‘pooled’
samples for multiple slaughtered birds. During the slaughtering
process at the markets, birds are defeathered and eviscerated before
carcasses are washed in a large bucket of water. We observed that
20–30 carcasses were often washed in the same container of water
before it was refreshed. These samples were positive for influenza A
RNA in 75% of samples from all four markets (ranging from 63 to
86%). Poultry drinking water was also a useful surveillance sample,
with 50% of samples testing positive for influenza A RNA; A/H5N1
isolation rates were higher when compared to carcass wash water.
Detection rates and isolation rates were also high with soil/mud
and discarded feather samples, but these specimens required more
complex processing before testing. High contamination of the
LBM environment, including relatively high rates of virus isolation,
is evidence that the risk of human exposure is very high. Carcass wash
water and poultry drinking water samples proved a useful adjunct to
poultry swabs for monitoring purposes in the LBMs.
Based solely on the HA typing, analysis of LBM samples collected
in 2013 revealed the presence of at least nine other subtypes of AIVs
co-circulating with A/H5N1 (Figure 5). This situation increases the
likelihood of reassortment events occurring, which may result in
the emergence of new influenza subtypes. The recent emergence of
reassortant HPAI subtypes of H5, such as A/H5N2, A/H5N5, A/H5N6
and A/H5N8,39–43 is evidence of the risk of new viruses arising
through reassortment events with A/H5N1. The sudden emergence
of multiple H5 subtypes has not been adequately explained but
could be related to the diversity of AIVs currently circulating in
domestic poultry populations. The emergence of A/H7N9 virus in
China in early 201344 has also prompted increased concerns about the
possibility of a pandemic virus emerging in the Asia-Pacific region.
Although most of the non-H5 AIVs detected in this study likely pose
little or no risk to humans, the high prevalence of multiple avian
influenza strains is an indictment on the poor biosecurity associated
with poultry rearing and selling in the region. Previous studies
and surveillance have also established that there is intense circulation
Figure 5 Heat map of the avian influenza virus positivity rate in four Cambodian live-poultry markets, 2013.
Table 2 Positive test results in participants and estimated seroprevalence and incidence rate, Cambodian live-bird markets study, 2013
Viruses testeda Number
positiveb
Number of
people sampledc
Global percentage
of positives
Binomial
95% CI
Number of
seroconversions
Participation
(person-month)d
Incidence (cases per
1000 person-months)
Poisson
95% CI
A/H5N1 5 111 4.50 1.5–10.2 4 1079 3.71 1.0–9.5
A/H9N2 2 111 1.80 0.2–6.4 1 1083 0.92 0.0–5.1
A/H7N9 0 111 0.00 0.0–3.3e 0 1102 0.00 0.0–3.3e
Total 7 111 6.31 2.6–12.6 5 1063 4.70 1.5–11.0
Abbreviation: confidence interval, CI.
aA/H5N1 Clade 1.1.2 reassortant strains, A/Cambodia/X0121311/2013 and A/Cambodia/X0125302/2013; A/H9N2 strain, A/Environment/Cambodia/E265/2013; A/H7N9 strain, A/Anhui/01/2013.
bExposure to these viruses was considered positive with a haemagglutination inhibition assay titre of ≥80 and a microneutralization assay titre of ≥40.
cOnly participants who provided samples for at least two time points were included in these analyses.
dParticipants were removed from further calculations once they were recorded as ‘positive’ in the assumption that antibodies are protective against further infections.
eOne-sided, 97.5% CI.
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of poultry between regions and across borders, which facilitates the
regional spread of AIVs.9,23
In our study, the detection of A/H5N1 was achieved using
qRT-PCR, whereas the detection of other AIVs was done using
universal multiplex RT-PCR assays with comparatively reduced
sensitivity. In addition, multiplex testing was only conducted where
there was disparity between M-gene and H5 qRT-PCR assays.
Furthermore, due to the difficulties with classifying influenza viruses
using incomplete gene sequences we have only reported LPAI
detection where we have been able to generate full HA or NA
sequences. It is therefore likely that the true prevalence of non-H5
AIVs was far greater than what we have reported in these market
samples. The potential for reassortment between AIVs, including
A/H5N1, could result in the emergence of viral strains with consider-
able impacts on poultry and/or human health. This study, coupled
with other recent studies in LBMs from other Asian countries,15–17
confirms that the environment of LBMs provides a pool of genes for
potential emergence of new pandemic viruses. The silent circulation of
a multitude of LPAI viruses, which remain undetected and unmoni-
tored in most Asian countries, heightens the threat when they
co-circulate with pandemic candidates such as A/H5N1 and A/H7N9.
As no poultry workers reported any symptoms in relation to acute
avian influenza infection, seroconversions in this study would most
likely be related to sub-clinical or very mild cases. It has been reported
that asymptomatic and mild avian influenza infections lead to
seroconversions with low antibody titres that quickly decrease below
the threshold recommended by WHO for a confirmed A/H5N1 case
(HIA≥ 160; MN≥ 80).45 For this reason, we considered as positive all
individuals with a HIA titre of ≥ 80 and a MN titre of ≥ 40, which is
consistent46 or more stringent47–52 than the cut-off levels suggested by
other authors. However, it is difficult to directly compare the results
between studies as there is no consensus on the antibody titre that
results from a mild or asymptomatic infection, and consistent cut-off
levels have not been used in past studies. According to our classification,
4.5% of workers who participated in the study had antibodies against
A/H5N1. This prevalence is much higher than that reported among
LBM workers in Egypt,53 Thailand47 or China,54 and much higher
than in villagers in Thailand51 or Cambodia.48 The incidence was
3.7 per 1000 person-months in our study, a figure twice that described
in Bangladesh in 2009–2010.46 There were no reported clinical signs in
our cohort, confirming that a large proportion of human A/H5N1
infections may go undetected. Poultry workers in Cambodia and other
Asian countries, where there is endemic circulation of A/H5N1, are
constantly exposed to high levels of virus. Although this may lead to
mild or sub-clinical infections with seroconversions, it seems that
transmission to humans resulting in acute infections is still rare.
Influenza A/H9 viruses, predicted to be A/H9N2 based on the
phylogenetic analysis of the HA and NA sequences repeatedly detected
in the same samples, were detected in 2.6% of samples analysed in
this study. Although A/H9N2 viruses have low pathogenicity for
poultry, novel HPAI and LPAI viruses affecting humans, such as
A/H5N1, A/H7N9 and A/H10N8, contain internal genes originating
from influenza A/H9N2.55–57 This may have facilitated the ability of
these viruses to cause infection and deaths in humans. Human
infections with A/H9N2 have been reported in the literature, and
seroprevalence studies have suggested that asymptomatic or mild
infections commonly occur in high-risk locations such as LBMs and
slaughterhouses.50,53,58,59 The detection of A/H9N2 antibodies in 1.8%
of LBM workers participating in our study and an incidence of 0.9
infections per 1000 person-months confirm other data on poultry-to-
human transmission of A/H9N2,53,59 including among rural villagers
in Cambodia.48 In addition, A/H9N2 infections have also been
detected in other mammals such as guinea pigs, dogs, horses and
pigs.59,60 The ability of A/H9N2 to cross the species barrier and
the relatively high frequency in which it has been implicated in
reassortment events suggest that this virus significantly contributes to
the emergence of viruses that pose an important public health risk and
should therefore be very closely monitored.
In this study we document intense co-circulation of influenza
A/H5N1 and LPAI viruses in Cambodian LBMs during 2013.
In addition, serological surveys provided evidence of sub-clinical
A/H5N1 and A/H9N2 infections. Interventions such as regular clean-
ing/disinfection, bans on overnight poultry storage, targeted closure
during periods of peak circulation and segregation of poultry slaughter-
ing areas should be considered in LBMs to reduce the threat of the
emergence of AIVs with public health or animal health impacts. Further
monitoring of the circulation of influenza A/H5N1 in Cambodian
LBMs and research into the mechanisms associated with human cases is
warranted.
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